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Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures 
and Better Testing 
Margaret Gilhooley∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
After it was put on the market, Vioxx, a popular and widely-
advertised arthritis drug, was found to have cardiovascular risks.  It 
took fourteen months of intense negotiation before a warning was 
added to the labeling, which cautioned about use by those with heart 
disease and the “unknown” significance of study findings.1  When a 
later study confirmed the risk, Merck, the drug maker, withdrew the 
drug voluntarily from the market.2  The finding of such a serious risk 
after the drug was on the market and the time it took for a warning to 
be given, led to a loss of public confidence in the agency3 and a de-
bate about the regulatory system.  At the agency’s request, the Insti-
tute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Sciences studied 
the agency’s regulatory system and issued a report (“IOM Report”) 
on the future of drug safety, recommending legislative and regulatory 
changes based on a “vision of a transformed drug safety system” that 
has “at its core a Lifecycle approach to drug risks and benefits.”4
 ∗ Copyright Margaret Gilhooley, and Seton Hall Law Review (nonexclusive), 
2007.  Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School.  I worked in the Chief Counsel’s of-
fice for the FDA from 1975 to 1981.  Parts of this Article are based on a presentation 
at the Seton Hall Law Review Drug Symposium on Feb. 16, 2006.  I appreciate the 
library help of Jeanne O'Connor and the research assistance of James Hanley. 
 1 See infra Part II. 
 2 Alice Dembner, Maker Takes Vioxx Off Market, Heart Risk Known Earlier Some Say, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2004, at A1. 
 3 Beckey Bright, Americans Growing Less Confident in FDA’s Job on Safety, Poll Shows, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May 24, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114 
831296787359612-16zrHG_MBAihgfzpdsZP1YC91kU_20070524.html?mod=blogs. 
 4 NAT. ACAD. OF SCIENCES—INST. OF MED., COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. 
DRUG SAFETY SYS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE 
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (2006) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
GILHOOLEY_FINAL 10/18/2007  10:26:51 AM 
942 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:941 
 
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments of 2007 
(FDAA) became law shortly before this Article went to the printer.5  
This Article does not attempt a full analysis of the new legislation.  In-
stead, this Article examines the importance of the procedures govern-
ing testing and warnings, a matter Congress has left to the agency to 
resolve.6   
This Article begins with a summary of the regulatory history of 
Vioxx because of its relevance to the debate on procedures and the 
need for reform.  The controversy about Vioxx also led to Congres-
sional hearings,7 newspaper coverage and product liability litigation8 
that have examined the basis for Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA, or “agency”) decision-making to a degree not usually available.  
The history is also pertinent because Vioxx exemplified modern drug 
testing, regulation, and marketing.  As has long been known, pre-
market tests cannot detect the range of risks users may face, and the 
existing post-market adverse event reporting system is inadequate to 
do so.9  Vioxx was also engaged in a competitive battle with Celebrex, 
another arthritis drug made by Pfizer, and both drugs were heavily 
advertised to consumers on television.  Both drugs were also ap-
proved by the FDA as priority review drugs that represented a “sig-
nificant improvement over existing drugs,” a showing that was based 
on a surrogate endpoint.10  The approval of drugs on a priority basis 
also helps the agency meet the timing goals that the FDA accepted 
when Congress imposed user fees on drug sponsors to permit the 
agency to hire more reviewers.11  Drugs intended for chronic use, like 
 5 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
110 Stat. 823.  
 6 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(3)(F), (4)(d), 121 Stat. 823, 924–25; see also infra Part 
V. 
 7 See, e.g., FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the S. 
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Health Comm. 
Hearing];The FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing Before the S. Fin. 
Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Finance Comm. Hearing]. 
 8 Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx’s 
Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1. 
 9 See IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 108–10; see infra Part III. 
 10 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 379h (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (designating current user 
fees); FDA White Paper, Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Adding Resources and 
Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications (2005) [hereinafter Im-
proving Performance in FDA Review], reprinted in PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND 
DRUG LAW 680 (3d ed. 2007). 
 11 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Prod-
ucts, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1840–42 (1996) (finding that changes accompanying the 
enactment of the user fee legislation led to a change in culture at the agency, which 
made meeting deadlines “a legitimate measure” of the performance of review officers 
and their supervisors); Carol Rados, The FDA Speeds Medical Treatment for Serious Dis-
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Vioxx, may come on the market with limited testing.12  After a drug is 
on the market, the sponsor may seek approval for new uses or new 
claims.  Articles may also appear in medical journals about a new use, 
as they did for Vioxx,13 before or without FDA approval, and these 
medical articles can lead to an increase in the number of prescrip-
tions for the drug for off-label use. 
This Article focuses on two changes that are needed in light of 
this regulatory history.  The first is the need for procedures that per-
mit prompt action when the agency seeks warnings about a drug’s 
risks found after marketing.  Procedure is power.  Providing for more 
expeditious procedures gives the agency greater ability to protect the 
public but safegaurds are also needed to protect against abuse.  The 
FDA attributed the length of time it took to require a warning for Vi-
oxx to the limits of its authority and to the procedures involved.14  
The present procedures involve formal hearings, but the FDAA pro-
vides for other types of dispute resolution that the agency is to de-
termine by regulation and guidance.15  This Article maintains that the 
limits of the initial testing and the experimental aspect of drug use 
are important factors that must be considered in evaluating the fair-
ness and appropriateness of the new procedures.16
This Article also looks at the desirability of encouraging better 
drugs.  Consideration is needed of proposals to provide non-patent 
exclusivity for drugs that do long-term outcome testing, as well as for 
drugs for high-need, high-risk areas, such as the prevention of Alz-
heimer’s disease.17  In the absence of such testing, the drug label 
should provide a disclosure of the extent to which drugs approved on 
a priority basis have been shown by long-term tests to have a signifi-
cant therapeutic improvement over an identified drug.18   
eases, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Mar.–Apr. 2006, available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
fdac/features/2006/206_treatments.html (describing priority drugs as those that of-
fer a significant improvement over marketed therapies and reporting that the time 
for approving a priority drug has decreased since 1990 from twenty-five months to six 
months).. 
 12 See Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 18 (statement of Prof. Bruce Psaty, 
Univ. of Washington) [hereinafter Psaty Testimony] (stating that at the time of ap-
proval only 371 and 381 patients had received doses of 12.5 or 25mg, respectively, for 
one year or more); see infra Part II.D. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 15 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 sec. 901(a), § 
355(o)(3)(F), 121 Stat. 823, 924.  
 16 See infra Part III. 
 17 Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 355 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 619, 622 (2006). 
 18 See infra Part V. 
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To explore these issues, Part II provides a case study of the regu-
latory history of the FDA’s approval of Vioxx and the FDA’s regula-
tory response to the safety issues found with Vioxx.  The discussion 
helps to identify the standards the FDA applies in practice.  It also 
provides examples that can permit evaluation of the need for the 
statutory changes that have now been made. 
Part III provides an overview of some of the changes in how the 
agency’s regulatory experience bears on the agency’s authority and 
on the procedures to require warnings about newly-discovered risk.  
The discussion notes the reasons risks are found after drugs are ap-
proved.  This Part also reviews the scope of the agency’s existing 
statutory and procedural authority for seeking labeling changes  be-
fore the recent legislative changes and summarizes some of the nota-
ble testimony on the difficulties with the procedures.  The range of 
views in the FDA’s legislative testimony is summarized.   
Part IV notes features of key procedural changes in the new leg-
islation.  The discussion examines the agency’s authority to establish 
dispute resolution procedures and considers issues for implementa-
tion. 
Part V explores whether new incentives or disclosures are 
needed to encourage drug manufacturers to seek initial approval for 
drugs that have been shown in long-term clinical tests to have a sig-
nificant therapeutic advantage over existing drugs.  This Part consid-
ers the proposal to provide non-patent exclusivity as a means to 
achieve this aim and also suggests that disclosures should be consid-
ered about the extent of testing done for priority drugs. 
The conclusion in Part VI summarizes the ways in which the 
regulatory history of Vioxx provides perspective on needed reforms. 
II. REGULATORY HISTORY OF VIOXX AND  
LEGISLATIVE TESTIMONY ON AGENCY AUTHORITY 
This Part provides the case study of the steps involved in the 
FDA’s approval of Vioxx and other Cox-2 drugs, and how the agency 
responded to the information about cardiovascular risks and applied 
the findings on a class basis when Vioxx was withdrawn because of 
cardiovascular risk findings.  The discussion will also note the specific 
issues raised by the regulatory history that relate to the debate about 
the need for statutory changes. 
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A. Vioxx and Cox-2 Approval for Pain 
1. Initial Approval for Pain and Arthritis 
Vioxx was initially approved for short term acute pain and arthri-
tis in May 1999.19  The study was a placebo test and thus did not pro-
vide any showing that it was better than existing drugs for pain.  A 
number of the studies were short-term studies done to assess pain, 
but one expert who testified in the congressional hearings did not be-
lieve they were adequate to evaluate side effects, such as heart attack, 
that were common in the population and that may arise from chronic 
use.20  Celebrex had also been approved for arthritis use.21  Both 
drugs were given priority review by the agency, which led to a faster 
approval, because, according to an FDA official, “it was hoped and 
expected that these drugs would provide an important GI [gastroin-
testinal] safety advantage” although the “agency couldn’t know until 
[agency officials] reviewed the data.”22
The FDA approved a statement on special studies in the labeling 
for Celebrex and Vioxx that there was a reduction of esophageal ul-
cers compared to other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAID); however, this was based only on a scope test to examine the 
esophagus.23  The labeling contained a warning on the risk of stom-
ach bleeding, and a statement that the correlation between the scope 
test and the reduction of serious G.I. events with different products 
“has not been fully established.”24  Merck undertook a study for  
Vioxx, but no long-term studies were conducted on Celebrex.25
The approvals for these drugs resemble those of fast-track drugs, 
since the drugs received a faster review, and further testing was 
 19 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Sequence of Events with Vioxx, Since Opening of 
IND, http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_04_E-FDA-
TAB-C.htm. [hereinafter FDA Briefing Materials].  Vioxx and Celebrex belong to the 
class of drugs known as Cox-2 inhibitors. 
 20 See Psaty Testimony, supra note 12, at 18. 
 21 PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2901 (54th ed. 2000). 
 22 See Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 60 (statement of Dr. Sandra Kweder, 
Acting Director of Office of New Drugs, FDA) [hereinafter Kweder Finance Comm. 
Testimony]. 
 23 See PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 1912–13, 2901–03 (discussing Vioxx and Cele-
brex, respectively). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Barry Meier et. al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain 
Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A38 (noting that “[i]n other words, the world’s 
best-selling COX-2 [drug, Celebrex,] has never been proved to the F.D.A.’s satisfac-
tion to have the stomach-protecting benefits that originally were supposed to be the 
point of that category of drugs.”). 
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needed to confirm the G.I. benefit.  However, the agency considered 
Vioxx  to be a priority drug, and did not characterize it as a fast-track 
drug in the approval letter sent to the company.26
2. Theoretical Cardiovascular Risks 
The theoretical possibility that Vioxx was linked to cardiovascu-
lar risks was raised in the medical review before Vioxx was first ap-
proved.  The reviewer commented that: 
The most frequent serious adverse events were of the cardiovascu-
lar body system in all study groupings.  With the available data, it 
is impossible to answer with complete certainty whether the risk 
of cardiovascular and thromboembolic events is increased in pa-
tients on rofecoxib.  A larger database will be needed to answer 
this and other safety comparison questions.27
When Dr. Sandra Kweder testified for the FDA at the Senate Fi-
nance Committee about the decision-making for Vioxx, she was asked 
about why the labeling did not reflect this potential risk.  She ac-
cepted the characterization that the information was a “theoretical 
concern” but not “an evidentiary concern.”28  The agency also found 
“quite reassuring” the safety database for Vioxx, which was larger 
than that for most drugs, as well as the studies underway, which 
would be informative because it is “hard to miss a heart attack” in a 
 26 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S REPORT ON NEW  
HEALTH CARE PRODUCTS APPROVED IN 1999 (1999), 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00998.html [hereinafter FDA 1999 
REPORT] (reporting the approval of rofecoxib, the official name for Vioxx, as a  
priority drug); Second Letter from Robert J. DeLap, M.D., CDER, FDA, to Robert E. 
Silverman, M.D., Merck Research Laboratories (May 20, 1999), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/for/appletter/1999/21042ltr.pdf; see also supra Part II.A.1. 
 27 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Excerpts from Primary Review of  
NDA 21-042 Osteoarthritis 9 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/ 
dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_05_F-FDA-Tab-D-1.pdf.  Documents found in 
the litigation that ensued after Vioxx was withdrawn indicated that there was biologi-
cal evidence that led some Merck scientists to believe by this time there was a theo-
retical risk.  See Mathews & Martinez, supra note 8; see also Psaty Testimony, supra note 
12, at 18.  Professor Psaty stated that  
[b]y April 1998, Merck scientists knew of evidence that COX-2 inhibi-
tors such as Vioxx . . . not only lacks the anti-platelet effects of asprin, 
but it also disables one of the blood vessel’s main defenses against the 
clumping of platlets.  On the basis of this biologic evidence, it would  
be reasonable to hypothesize that the treatment of patients with Vioxx  
might increase the risk of heart attack and stroke compared with either 
an aspirin-like treatment or with placebo . . . .  
Id. 
 28 Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 61 (responding to a ques-
tion from Senator Breaux).  
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clinical trial.  In view of the later studies showing a cardiovascular 
risk, more attention is needed to determine whether theoretical con-
cerns based on risk signals in clinical trials should be disclosed in 
some way in the labeling. 
B. Review of the VIGOR Study in 2000–04 
1. G.I. Benefit and Value of Outcome Studies 
The Cox-2 drugs were believed on a theoretical basis to have a 
gastrointestinal benefit that earlier drugs did not have.29  Merck un-
dertook a clinical outcome study, called the VIGOR study,30 to de-
termine if stomach bleeding is actually reduced in a comparison be-
tween Vioxx and naprosyn.31  The study results submitted to the FDA 
for review in March 2000 demonstrated a comparative benefit, but 
also showed an increased risk of heart attacks and other cardiovascu-
lar events at a high fifty milligram dose—this dose was approved only 
for acute pain relief, but was used in the test to establish a “worst 
case” estimate of the risk of stomach bleeding, in order to permit a 
comparison between the drugs for purpose of determining efficacy.32  
One lesson is the value of clinical outcome studies in finding a risk, 
compared to relying solely on surrogate indicators. 
2. Cardiovascular Findings and Need for a  
Cardiovascular Test 
After the VIGOR results were received, an FDA advisory commit-
tee recommended more studies but not a withdrawal, and the FDA 
discussed with Merck the possibility of a study especially designed to 
identify cardiovascular effects.33  Merck cited ethical and logistical 
concerns in doing such a study.34  Merck attributed the cardiovascular 
difference to the ability of naprosyn to reduce risks; the FDA did not 
 29 See Andrew Pollack, New Scrutiny of Drugs in Vioxx Family, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2004, at C1. 
 30 VIGOR stands for “Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research.” 
 31 Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 50–51. 
 32 Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, M.D., & Paul J. Seligman, M.D., M.P.H. 
through Steven Galson, M.D., M.P.H. 5, 9 n.5 (Apr. 6, 2005), 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/NSAIDdecisionMemo.pdf [here-
inafter Decision Memorandum] (noting that Vioxx at the fifty milligram dose was 
associated with “a hazard ratio of approximately two compared to naproxen based on 
a composite endpoint of death, MI [myocardial infarctions] or stroke.”).  
 33 Alex Berenson et. al., Retracing a Medical Trail; Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took 
Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at A1 (citing Dr. Kweder of the 
FDA). 
 34 Id. at A32. 
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accept this protective theory, but was influenced by the lack of a car-
diovascular effect in other studies.35  Merck also suggested monitor-
ing cardiovascular results in the ongoing APPROVe trial as an alter-
native, even though the study was not directed at cardiovascular 
effects, but rather at whether Vioxx helped prevent colon cancer.36  
The failure of Merck to do a cardiovascular study for Vioxx has been 
a continuing issue among researchers.37  Whether the FDA needs to 
have more authority to require tests has also emerged as a matter of 
debate. 
3. Negotiation on Cardiovascular Labeling  
In 2002, the FDA approved a G.I. benefit claim of Vioxx com-
pared to naprosyn based on the VIGOR study.  At the same time, the 
FDA required labeling about the cardiovascular findings for Vioxx 
but there has been controversy about the adequacy of the labeling 
and the process of negotiations that led to the labeling changes.  In a 
Senate hearing, Dr. Sandra Kweder of the FDA testified in connec-
tion with labeling changes that “[w]e have to negotiate with the com-
pany [about] the specific language of how this should be worded 
[and regarding] placement.”38  The need for change in the agency’s 
authority will be discussed later, and while some negotiations be-
tween the government and those subject to regulation have a place in 
a democracy, these particular negotiations seem to have been in-
tense.39
4. Adequacy of Labeling Disclosures 
The FDA approved labeling for a G.I. benefit based on the 
VIGOR study that included under the “Precautions” section of the la-
bel a statement that “caution should be exercised when Vioxx is used 
in patients with a medical history of ischemic heart disease.”40  More-
over, at the end of a paragraph with a detailed description of the 
study’s results at the fifty milligram dose level, the labeling stated that 
“[t]he significance of the cardiovascular findings from [VIGOR and 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health—Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707, 1708 (2004) (describing the use of Vioxx as “an enormous 
public health issue” and maintaining that the FDA had “the authority to mandate 
that a trial be conducted, but it never took the initiative.”). 
 38 Health Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Dr. Kweder, Deputy Di-
rector Office of New Drugs, FDA) [hereinafter Kweder Health Comm. Testimony]. 
 39 See FDA Briefing Materials, supra note 19. 
 40 PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2110 (54th ed. 2004). 
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two placebo studies] is unknown” and that prospective studies on the 
cardiovascular events “have not been performed.”41  The description 
of the VIGOR study also stated that “[t]he VIGOR study showed a 
higher incidence of adjudicated serious cardiovascular thrombotic 
events in patients treated with Vioxx 50mg once daily as compared to 
patients treated with naprosyn . . . .”42
The labeling has been described as “tepid” and as having been 
written in “small print that comes with prescription drugs (and that 
few actually read).”43  The lack of studies to evaluate the significance 
of the cardiovascular findings is an important point, and, given the 
implications, the point should have been more prominent.  The la-
beling suggests, at least to lay readers, that the drug has an unknown 
potential to cause other cardiovascular risks, perhaps to those without 
heart disease, or at a lower level.  In retrospect, given the results of 
the APPROVe study, the criteria need to be clearer as to when risks at 
a high dose level can reasonably be extrapolated to assume that risks 
exist at lower levels. 
5. Need for Earlier Warnings—Existing Approvals 
Another criticism of the FDA’s handling of the VIGOR results 
has been that the FDA should have issued the warnings earlier.  Dr. 
Kweder testified at a Senate hearing that the labeling change took “a 
very long time” and “much longer than usual” although Merck acted 
responsibly once the problem was recognized and was trying to col-
lect data from existing studies.44
However, an earlier warning would seem to have been especially 
needed, since the risks found in the VIGOR study did not just relate 
to a drug that had yet to be marketed.  Vioxx was already on the mar-
ket for acute and chronic pain.  This provides an illustration of how 
the expanding claims for on-market drugs can lead to the discovery 
of new risks through outcome tests conducted to support the claim. 
6. Medical Articles and Off-Label Uses 
The risk to existing users may be even greater if a medical jour-
nal carries articles about a new use for an existing drug even before 
the FDA has approved the use, and doctors may start prescribing the 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Marcia Angell, Your Dangerous Drugstore, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 8, 2006, 
available at http://www.nybooks/articles/19055.  The FDA has since dropped the 
precaution category as a separate listing. 
 44 Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 59. 
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drug off-label for that new use.45  Indeed, in 2000, shortly after the 
VIGOR results were submitted to the FDA, the New England Journal 
of Medicine (“Journal”) published an article about the study with a 
Merck scientist as a co-author.46  Five years later, the journal repudi-
ated the article, and some have criticized the Journal for failing to 
correct it even earlier to reflect criticisms of the “naprosyn protective” 
theory that the FDA had rejected.47  A recent report also points out 
the revenues that can come to medical journals from sales of re-
prints.48
C. Cardiovascular Findings in 2004 in APPROVe study: Vioxx 
Withdrawal and Class Relevance for Celebrex and Other Drugs 
1. Study Findings and Vioxx Withdrawal 
While Vioxx remained on the market, the FDA and Merck 
looked to the APPROVe trial to monitor the cardiovascular effects of 
the drug.  The trial was intended to determine if Vioxx helped pre-
vent colon cancer.  In fall 2004, before the study was complete, the 
researchers in this long-term, placebo-controlled trial found a statisti-
cally increased cardiovascular risk with a twenty-five milligram dose, 
the dose level at which Vioxx was prescribed for chronic pain.49  
Merck reported the findings to the FDA and voluntarily withdrew the 
drug. Merck regarded the APPROVe study as providing the “first de-
finitive data . . . that demonstrated that there was a higher risk of car-
diovascular events” from Vioxx.50
2. Public Health Advisory and Relevance for Celebrex 
The withdrawal set off public concern about what drug patients 
should use as an alternative.  The FDA issued a Public Health Advi-
sory that recommended limited use of all Cox-2 inhibitors, including 
 45 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated, 
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating on procedural grounds); see also Margaret 
Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution after Western States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 
901, 912 (2003) (discussing the impact of the constitutional protections for commer-
cial speech for FDA-regulated products). 
 46 Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib 
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000). 
 47 David Armstrong, How the New England Journal Missed Warning Signs on Vioxx, 
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at A1. 
 48 Id. (reporting that the Journal sold more than 900,000 reprints bringing in at 
least $697,000 and that Merck bought most of the reprints). 
 49 Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 3. 
 50 Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 69 (testimony of Raymond Gilmartin, 
Chairman, President, and CEO of Merck). 
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Celebrex.51  The announcement indicated that even long-term use of 
naprosyn may be associated with an increased cardiovascular risk.  An 
interim recommendation made Celebrex effectively a second choice, 
since the advisory stated that patients would be “appropriate candi-
date[s]” for Celebrex when they are intolerant to drugs like napro-
syn.  The issuance of the press statement and Public Health Advisory 
also illustrates the significance of the agency’s ability to issue state-
ments about public health problems without advance procedures. 
3. FDA Decision Memorandum and Class Effect 
Determinations—Applicability to Other Drugs 
In April 2005, the FDA issued a Decision Memorandum inter-
preting the available data as “best interpreted as being consistent with 
a class effect of an increased risk of serious adverse [cardiovascular] 
events for Cox-2 selective [like Celebrex] and non-selective NSAIDs 
[like naprosyn].”52  Naprosyn also had cardiovascular effects, al-
though at a lesser rate than Vioxx, leading the agency to extend the 
class beyond Cox-2 drugs to encompass all NSAIDs.  The agency did 
not believe a rank ordering of the drugs within the class was possible 
given the available data, and thus it recommended a boxed warning 
for the entire expanded class.  The agency recognized that patient 
variations in response to drugs provided “in part a valid rationale for 
maintaining a range of options” of NSAID drugs from which patients 
and doctors may choose.53
Pfizer implemented the FDA recommendation that a prominent 
boxed warning about Celebrex’s cardiovascular risks be provided on 
the labeling.54   The agency strongly encouraged the company to do a 
long-term comparative safety study in relationship to naprosyn,55 and 
the company later funded a study that addressed the ethical con-
cerns.56  The FDA also identified an interest in a broader type of study 
 51 FDA Talk Paper, FDA Issues Public Health Advisory Recommending Limited Use of 
Cox-2 Inhibitors, Dec. 23, 2004, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/ 
ANS01336.html. 
 52 Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 2. 
 53 Id. at 11.  Maintaining a range of options did not keep the agency from suc-
cessfully seeking the withdrawal of Bextra, another Cox-2 drug, which had the addi-
tional problem of potentially causing life-threatening skin rashes.  Id. at 12–13. 
 54 Id.  A National Cancer Institute study also found in December 2004 that Cele-
brex had a risk of heart disease.  See Meier et al., supra note 25, at A2; Decision 
Memorandum, supra note 32, at 10 (finding Celebrex and Vioxx “are associated with 
an increased risk of serious CV events . . . .”). 
 55 Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 16. 
 56 Stephanie Saul, Pfizer to Finance $100 Million Safety Study of Celebrex, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2005, at C3.  This article reports that the study will examine the safety of the 
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and stated that the “agency should work closely with sponsors and 
other interested stakeholders (e.g., [the National Institutes of  
Health]) to encourage additional long-term controlled clinical trials 
of non-selective NSAIDs to further evaluate the potential for in-
creased risk.”57  Pfizer has also recently resumed consumer advertise-
ments for Celebrex that contain the boxed warnings about Celebrex, 
naprosyn, and other NSAID drugs.58  Interestingly, Celebrex re-
bounded with two billion dollars in sales and eighteen percent 
growth in 2006.59
4. Earlier Non-Class Finding 
The Decision Memorandum made the findings from the  
APPROVe study on Vioxx applicable to Celebrex without the need 
for a specific test finding a cardiovascular effect for Celebrex.  The 
effect is presumed unless studies can show otherwise.  These findings 
of a class effect have a powerful impact.  Earlier, however, when the 
VIGOR study first showed a cardiovascular effect for Vioxx, the FDA 
and an advisory committee considered whether a similar disclosure 
was needed on Celebrex and decided against it.60  The criteria and 
process for class determinations is an important question.  A recent 
medical journal reported data on a large number of users showing 
that Vioxx, but not Celebrex, is associated with an increased risk of a 
first heart attack but that those with a prior heart attack may be at an 
increased risk if they use either drug.61
While the agency relied on the clinical testing in requiring the 
warnings for the Cox-2 drugs, it put little weight on observational 
tests.  The agency reported that its advisory committee members 
“generally agreed that the observational data could not definitively 
address the question of a modestly increased [cardiovascular] risk for 
drug compared to Naproxen and Ibuprofen in arthritis patients prone to heart at-
tack and stroke, and that some believe that undertaking this study might increase 
sales by raising consumer confidence in the drug.  Id. 
 57 Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 3. 
 58 Alex Berenson, Celebrex Ads are Back, Dire Warnings and All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2006, at C3. 
 59 Associated Press, Pfizer Predicts Earnings Below Expectations and Flat Sales for ’06, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at C1; Bloomberg News, 3 Drug Makers Gain as Top Sellers 
Keep Up Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006, at C13. 
 60 In re Bextra and Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 
M:05-1699, 2006 WL 2374742, at *3, *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (finding preemp-
tion of tort liability based on agency determinations). 
 61 Cox-2 Drugs May Raise Risk of Repeat Heart Attack, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSCOL96132120070129 (summa-
rizing a study by Dr. James M. Brophy published in HEART). 
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the Cox-2 selective compared to the non-selective NSAIDs, with the 
possible exception of data on [Vioxx] 50mg.”62  The role of observa-
tional studies and the limits of testing received attention in the con-
gressional hearings. 
D. Limits of Testing 
The legislative hearing also heard testimony from an expert that 
the short-term pre-market testing for Vioxx was “not adequate” to de-
tect the potential cardiovascular risks for a drug intended for chronic 
use and that these risks are “best evaluated” by longer ones.63  On the 
other hand, a former FDA official testified that small studies serving 
as the basis for approval are not designed to detect rare adverse 
events, that “it’s not realistic to increase the size” of the tests to detect 
rare events, and that improvements are needed in post-approval 
monitoring and studies.64
E. FDA Structure and Role of Observational Studies 
The Senate Finance Committee hearing was notable for the 
criticisms by Dr. David Graham, a director of the FDA Drug Safety Of-
fice, who considered the FDA to be “broken.”65  He believed that the 
office responsible for drug approvals had a conflict of interest in 
evaluating post-market safety risk and was “dominated by a worldview 
that believes only randomized clinical trials provide useful and ac-
tionable information, and the post-marketing safety is an after-
thought.”66  He complained that his office had no regulatory power 
and could act only if the office responsible for new drug review 
agreed.67  He criticized the agency for insisting on a statistically sig-
nificant result before finding a safety risk.68  He also endorsed use of 
observational studies such as one he did on Vioxx with Kaiser-
Permanente that was funded by the FDA.  In his view, the study 
 62 Decision Memorandum, supra note 32, at 7. 
 63 Psaty Testimony, supra note 12, at 18–20. 
 64 Health Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 59 (statement of William B. Schultz, Part-
ner, Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP) [hereinafter Schultz Testimony].  Schultz also stated 
that “at this time, I personally am not aware of any evidence that FDA made a mistake 
in approving those drugs.”  Id.  Schultz formerly worked at FDA.  Id.  
 65 Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 16 (statement of David J. Graham, Asso-
ciate Director for Science and Medicine, Office of Drug Safety, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration) [hereinafter Graham Testimony]. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id.; see Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 56 (stating that the 
authority for final regulatory drug decisions rests with the Office of New Drugs). 
 68 Graham Testimony, supra note 65, at 17. 
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showed 28,000 cases of excess heart attacks were due to Vioxx.69  On 
the other hand, Dr. Kweder of the FDA believed the observational 
study was of limited value because it did not identify which patients 
were taking aspirin and whether the Vioxx patients in the study were 
already at high risk.70  The Graham critique has led to proposals for 
organizational changes that would make determinations of drug 
safety largely independent of those involved in new drug approvals.71  
However, the focus here is on the procedures to govern the agency’s 
new authority and on the incentives for better testing. 
III. AGENCY EXPERIENCE WITH THE LIMITS OF TESTING  
AND THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURES 
This Part examines the agency’s general regulatory experience 
with respect to the procedures that govern the agency’s ability to re-
quire new warnings about risks that are found after a drug first comes 
on the market.  This examination starts by noting the limits of drug 
testing and the policy reasons for lessening the rigor of the proce-
dures, namely, that on-market drugs have an experimental quality, 
since pre-approval testing cannot detect all the risks the user will face.  
The discussion notes that a less rigorous procedure already exists for 
fast-track drugs but not for similar priority drugs like Vioxx.  Against 
this background, Part IV provides an overview of the legislative 
changes that have been made to the agency’s authority and the pro-
cedures to govern requirements for post-approval testing and  
warnings. 
A. Limits of Pre-Market Testing and Experimental Aspects of Post-
Market Drug Use 
As has long been known, the risks drugs pose cannot be fully 
known from the testing done before approval.  This potential for new 
risks gives post-market use an experimental aspect that increases the 
importance of the agency’s ability to respond expeditiously when new 
risks arise.  The discussion below illustrates the various ways that the 
knowledge of post-approval risks is limited. 
 69 Id. at 13–15. 
 70 Berenson et al., supra note 33, at A1.
 71 See generally Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of Vigi-
lance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 2647 (2004). 
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1. Early FDA Recognition of Limits of Testing 
George Larrick, a former Commissioner of the FDA, pointed out 
in 1964 that the early period of drug marketing represents “a final 
step in the testing of the product” and that there is “no way to dupli-
cate fully in clinical trials the great variety” of conditions under which 
a drug will be used when approved.72
2. Managing the Risk Report 
A 1999 FDA Task Force Report (“Task Force Report”) on man-
aging these risks explained the limits of clinical trials and why risks 
can be found after approval.  The size and length of the trials, as well 
as the similarity of clinical patients needed to determine efficacy, 
limit the ability to predict the risk when used by the wider popula-
tion.73  The Task Force Report also described why the agency has con-
fidence in the trials74 but also noted measures such as community tri-
als, which could provide additional options to determine risks.75  The 
Task Force Report further recognized that the drug sponsor needs to 
recoup the costs of drug development, and, as a consequence, manu-
facturers may roll out new products rapidly after approval.76
3. IOM Report on Limits of Testing and a Risk 
Management Approach 
The IOM Report recognized that limitations are “inherent in the 
system and cannot be changed without adding considerably to the 
time and expense of drug approvals, which would delay patient access 
to potentially beneficial drugs.”77  The length of the studies is deter-
mined primarily by the effort to prove efficacy, and not safety.78  The 
IOM Committee recommended a risk management approach to drug 
risks and also that Congress ensure that the agency can require clini-
 72 Drug Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 88th Cong. 2 (1964) (statement of George Larrick, FDA Commissioner), re-
printed in HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 86. 
 73 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Managing the Risk from Medical Product Use: 
Creating a Risk Management Framework 43–46 (May 1999), http://www.fda.gov/ 
oc/tfrm/riskmanagement.pdf. 
 74 Id. at 44 (stating that “[c]linical trial investigators expect the majority of severe 
toxicities to be detected through a combination of high-exposure animal studies and 
the current profile of trial size and duration.”). 
 75 Id. at 45, 50. 
 76 Id. at 47–48. 
 77 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. 
 78 Id. 
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cal trials and other measures when needed to match the safety con-
cerns and benefits presented by a drug.79
The IOM also emphasized that the existing post-market monitor-
ing of adverse events can detect rare and uncommon serious side ef-
fects that are unrelated to the indications for the drug.80  However, it 
is not very effective for detecting a drug’s contribution in increasing 
the frequency of common events.81  The IOM Report recommended 
improvements in post-market surveillance that will permit better 
identification of these risks.  These may include use of electronic 
health insurance records to identify early risk signals.82
B. Criticisms of the Rigor of the Existing Formal Procedures 
There are considerable hurdles to the agency’s existing authority 
to seek new warnings (including withdrawing a drug through an ad-
ministrative proceeding or bringing an action in the courts), which 
has resulted in criticism of the agency in the wake of Vioxx.  The dis-
cussion here starts by examining the existing procedures and the dif-
ficulties they pose. 
1. Agency’s Existing Authority to Obtain Changes 
The agency can withdraw an approved drug from the market if 
“new evidence of clinical experience” or tests by new methods show 
that the drug is no longer safe under the conditions of use.83  While 
the provision does not expressly authorize the agency to require 
warnings, the agency can indirectly do so by finding that the new in-
formation affects the ability to find the drug safe as labeled, or that it 
makes the label misleading.  The withdrawal proceeding, however, is 
subject to a formal adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law 
judge. 84 The administrative proceeding to withdraw drugs is gov-
erned by formal hearing, which can be lengthy and resource-
intensive.  For example, removal of ineffective pre-1962 drugs took 
thirty years, in part because of the need to provide formal hearings 
before removal of the drug.85  Interestingly, the appellate courts have 
 79 Id. at 169–70. 
 80 Id. at 108–10; see generally David Kessler, Introducing MedWatch: A New Approach 
to Reporting Medication and Device Adverse Effects and Product Failures, 269 JAMA 2765 
(1993). 
 81 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 108–110. 
 82 Id. at 114. 
 83 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(2) (2000). 
 84 See  Id.  § 355(e). 
 85 See Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1316–17 (D.D.C. 
1972) (setting a deadline for the FDA to remove ineffective drugs); see also HUTT ET 
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become increasingly willing to defer to agency decisions to use in-
formal hearings rather than formal proceedings to resolve adminis-
trative disputes when statutes are ambiguous on the need for a formal 
hearing.86
The law also generally prohibits any drug from having mislead-
ing labeling.87  The agency may bring an action in the courts through 
the Department of Justice to seize and destroy the misbranded prod-
uct or to obtain an injunction.88  These court proceedings permit a 
direct remedy without the need for a prior administrative hearing if 
the lack of warnings makes the product deceptive.  The court action 
must also be brought through the Justice Department or through 
U.S. Attorneys, and therefore depends upon their willingness to allo-
cate resources to the effort.89
2. Legislative Testimony in Vioxx Hearings on Difficulties 
with Procedures 
The Senate hearings on Vioxx identified problems with the ex-
isting procedures.  Dr. Kweder, the FDA official who testified about 
Vioxx for the agency, stated her personal view that it would be “very 
helpful” if the FDA had specific authority to require drug manufac-
turers to change the labeling to reflect risks, although she recognized 
that drug companies often will comply with FDA requests for warn-
ings.90  A former FDA official also testified to the need for new au-
thority that would allow the agency to require warnings without a de-
AL., supra note 10, at 588 (reporting in 2007 that some administrative hearings are 
still pending or have not been held). 
 86 See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480–83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
see also RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 278–79 (2d ed. 
1992) (noting a change in judicial views on the desirability of formal adjudications). 
 87 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000). 
 88 See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 332, 334 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 89 See Adam Liptak, For Federal Prosecutors, Politics Is Ever-Present, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
18, 2007, at S3 (stating that eight U.S. attorneys were fired, and while they can be 
removed for any reason, they are “by custom insulated from political changes.”).  
 90 See Kweder Health Comm. Testimony, supra note 38, at 79–80 (testifying that “a 
stronger authority to require changes in labeling would be very helpful”); see also 
Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 54; Gardiner Harris, FDA Re-
sponds to Criticism with New Caution, N.Y. TIMES, AUG. 6, 2005, at A1 (quoting Dr. 
Stephen Gelson, Director of the Center for New Drugs at the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, with respect to the fourteen months that it took to get the Vioxx label 
changed that “[w]e’re not proud of how long that took, let me just be clear about 
that.”). 
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lay while a challenge is being made.91  The court proceedings were 
described as “cumbersome.”92  A newspaper report summarized the 
perception of the constraints on the FDA, noting that the agency 
“does not own a drug’s label, drug makers do.  Short of threatening a 
seizure if a label is not changed, the agency must negotiate with drug 
makers over any change.  This can lead to delays.”93  On the other 
hand, an FDA Deputy Commissioner testified that the agency’s exist-
ing authority is sufficient and that the “dialogue” between the agency 
and the company leads to better labeling.94
3. IOM Position on Need for New Authority 
The IOM found that the agency needs “increased enforcement 
authority and better enforcement tools directed at drug sponsors, 
which should include fines, injunctions, and withdrawal of drug  
approval.”95   
C. Priority Drugs and Relevance of Procedural Model for Fast-track 
Drugs 
Before turning to the changes made to procedure in the new 
law, it is relevant to note that a less rigorous procedure already exists 
in the law for fast-track drugs, but not for priority drugs like Vioxx,96 
even though surrogate endpoints may affect the expedited approval 
of both drugs.  The agency should be able to use a more expeditious 
procedure when drug use has experimental quality and new risks are 
found. 
 91 See Schultz Testimony, supra note 64, at 60–63 (maintaining that there is a 
need for authority to require labeling changes based on new information and to re-
quire post-market studies). 
 92 See id. at 63 (maintaining that withdrawal proceedings and court actions are 
“usually inappropriate and cumbersome” and leave the FDA “to negotiate changes” 
with the company).  Seizure actions are also subject to a jury trial on request.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 334(b) (2000). 
 93 Harris, supra note 90, at A1. 
 94 See Health Comm. Hearing, supra note 7, at 70 (statement of Scott Gottlieb, Resi-
dent Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (explaining that the “label changes that 
FDA works on aren’t worded very well” and “the dialogue that goes on between the 
agency and the sponsor results in much better labeling”).  Gottlieb was also a former 
FDA official.  Id. at 70. 
 95 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, 168–70. 
 96 See FDA 1999 REPORT, supra note 26 (reporting the approval of rofecoxib as a 
priority drug in less than six months). 
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1. Fast-track Model, Informal Hearings and Priority 
Review Drugs 
In response to the delays that occurred in the approval of AIDS 
drugs, the law now allows the agency to approve drugs on a fast-track 
basis for serious or life-threatening conditions, based on a “surrogate 
endpoint reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit” without the 
controlled outcome studies that are traditionally needed.97  Approval 
may be conditioned, however, on the completion of post-approval 
studies to validate or “otherwise confirm the effect” of the surrogate 
endpoint.98  The agency may withdraw approval of a fast-track drug 
under “expedited procedures” with an informal hearing when post-
market tests required for the drug are not performed or “other evi-
dence” shows that the drug is “not safe.”99  Under the present law, 
though, fast-track status applies only to drugs that the sponsor re-
quests be designated as part of that category.100
2. Priority Review Drugs Approved on the basis of 
Surrogate Endpoints 
The FDA also expedites approval for Priority Review Drugs that 
are a “significant improvement” compared to marketed products, 
which may be with respect to increased effectiveness, reduction of 
drug reactions, improvements for a subpopulation, or “documented 
enhancements of patient compliance.”101  The priority status rests on 
the agency’s inherent authority rather than a specific statutory  
provision. 
The importance of the Priority Review status is illustrated by Vi-
oxx.  As Dr. Kweder testified on behalf of the FDA, the drug was ini-
tially approved as a priority drug for a routine benefit in pain relief, 
because the surrogate endpoints showed promise to reduce stomach 
bleeding.102  Priority drugs are not subject to the same informal hear-
ing procedures and expanded agency authority that govern fast-track 
drugs, because the procedures apply only if the sponsor requests fast-
 97 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(1), (2)(A) (2000). 
 98 Id. § 356(b)(2). 
 99 Id. § 356(b)(3) (providing for expedited withdrawal); Id. § 321(x) (defining 
informal hearing).  This proposal relates to the procedures for warnings rather than 
the other provisions governing fast-track drugs.  Id. 
 100 Id. § 356(a)(1). 
 101 See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 6020.3 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/Cder/ 
mapp/6020.3R.pdf; HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 708–09. 
 102 See Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 60; see also FDA 1999 
REPORT, supra note 26. 
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track status.103  The priority drugs, however, should at a minimum be 
subject to the informal hearings that govern fast-track drugs.  Both 
priority and fast-track drugs may be approved based on surrogate 
endpoints, and, as the IOM Report pointed out, initial testing may be 
sufficient to show efficacy but not long-term safety.104  Priority drugs 
should be considered to have an experimental quality when there is 
limited clinical testing to show safety.  
Priority drugs are also significant because the expedited ap-
proval for these drugs has been especially important in speeding up 
the approval of drugs to meet the FDA timing goals—the FDA ac-
cepted these constraints when Congress required drug sponsors to 
pay user fees, which enabled the agency to hire more reviewers.105  
The FDA’s goal since 1997 has been to approve ninety percent of pri-
ority review drugs within six months.106
IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON TESTING, WARNINGS AND 
ENFORCEMENT, AND OPEN PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Shortly before this Article went to the printer, Congress enacted 
the FDAA, which makes important changes in a number of areas of 
FDA regulation.107  The new law, for example, requires sponsors to 
have a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) to reduce risks 
when needed to ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the 
risks.108  The focus here is on the provisions that expand the agency’s 
authority to require post-approval testing and warnings, that 
strengthen the agency’s enforcement powers, and that give the 
agency the role of resolving the procedures governing certain dis-
putes. 
A. Overview of Post-Approval Testing, Labeling and Enforcement 
Provisions 
The law authorizes the agency to require a drug sponsor to con-
duct post-approval studies or clinical studies for a drug (and those in 
the same class) on the basis of scientific data deemed appropriate to 
the agency.109  For an approved drug on the market, the requirement 
 103 21 U.S.C. § 356 (a)(1)–(2). 
 104 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 124–25. 
 105 See Rados, supra note 11. 
 106 See Improving Performance in FDA Review, supra note 10, at 680–82. 
 107 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
110 Stat. 823. 
 108 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355–1(p), 121 Stat. 823, 926–39.  
 109 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(1), (o)(3)(A), 121 Stat. 823, 922–23. 
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can only be made based on new safety information.110  A clinical study 
can be required only if other types of studies are not sufficient.111
The drug sponsor can appeal a requirement to conduct a study 
using “dispute resolution procedures established . . . in regulation 
and guidance.”112  The new law also authorizes the agency to require 
safety labeling changes subject to similar dispute resolution proce-
dures.113 The dispute resolution procedure can be determined by the 
issuance of a regulation that requires notice of a proposed ruling and 
an opportunity for comment, which are steps that can take some 
time.114  While the new law permits the use of agency guidance to es-
tablish the dispute resolution procedures, such guidance is now sub-
ject to more executive oversight than it was in the past.115  In effect, 
the search for appropriate procedures is still underway and has been 
left by Congress to the agency, subject to some constraints. 
The new law would also strengthen the agency’s enforcement 
powers by giving the agency the authority to impose fines or civil 
money penalties.116  Absent good cause, a sponsor who is in violation 
of a requirement that there be new testing is subject to a fine,117 as is a 
sponsor who fails to make a safety labeling change.118  These fines can 
be substantial—they are not to exceed $250,000 per violation, but can 
be doubled for every thirty days of a continued violation, up to 
$10,000,000 in a single proceeding.119  A formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge is still available to assess the fine.120
 110 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(3)(C), 121 Stat. 823, 923. 
 111 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(3)(D), 121 Stat. 823, 923. 
 112 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(4)(F), 121 Stat. 823, 925.   
 113 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, sec. 901(a), § 
355(o)(4)(D)–(F), 121 Stat. 823, 925. 
 114 Id., sec. 901(a), § 355(o)(4), 121 Stat. 823, 924–26. 
 115 Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (amending Execu-
tive Order 12,866 and making guidance subject to executive oversight, similar to the 
guidance for regulations). 
 116 Id., sec. 902(b), § 333, 121 Stat. 823, 943. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id., sec. 901(a), (b), §§ 355, 355–1, 121 Stat. 823, 922–38; Id., sec. 902(b), §§ 
352, 333, 121 Stat. 823, 943. 
 119 Id., sec. 902(b), § 333(4)(A), 121 Stat. 823, 943. 
 120 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(g)(3)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
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B. Factors in Assessing an Appropriate Procedural Framework 
1. Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test 
The balancing test used for procedural due process helps iden-
tify the considerations that can play a role both on a legal and policy 
basis.  That test looks at the private interest affected, the risk of error, 
and the public interest.121  The test is case-specific, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States gives some deference to the governmental 
choice.122  The issues in the hearings are likely to involve scientific 
and policy judgments rather than credibility issues, but the agency’s 
approach may be criticized as being ad hoc, a point raised in the IOM 
Report.123
In determining the proper balance, one factor that would make 
the public health interest particularly strong is when new risks are 
found for drugs that have an experimental aspect.  As noted above, 
the initial period of drug use can be seen as the final phase of drug 
testing.124  Moreover, there may be less information available on the 
safety risks of priority drugs and other drugs approved on a faster ba-
sis because of surrogate endpoints.125  The need to protect the public 
justifies having an expeditious procedure when the issue involves the 
need for new safety warnings—especially so when the risks emerge 
for an on-market drug, where use has an experimental quality given 
the limited ability of pre-market testing to discover risks. 
If the agency seeks to require a post-market clinical test as with 
Vioxx, the burdens of performing the test make the private interest 
stronger.  If there is a public health hazard, however, and the testing 
is not adequate to determine the scope of the risk, the public interest 
also weighs strongly.  Of course, a warning about the lack of the test-
ing may be another alternative to protect the public, an approach the 
FDA used with the VIGOR warning for Vioxx—but again, some be-
lieve that warning to have been insufficient.126
2. Options for Consideration 
The law already provides for the use of informal hearings for 
fast-track drugs if evidence demonstrates that the drug is not safe or if 
 121 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 122 Id. at 331. 
 123 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 123. 
 124 See infra Part II.A. 
 125 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 124–125. 
 126 See supra Part II .B.4. 
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the sponsor fails to complete post-approval studies.127  Informal hear-
ings are clearly preferable to formal hearings for many disputes,128 
and they represent one option for the new dispute resolution proc-
ess.  Other types of dispute resolution procedure are possible, so long 
as they maintain a fair balance among the relevant interests.  An in-
formal determination before an independent decision-maker may be 
another option.  The dispute resolution process sought may even be 
one that seeks to persuade directly the officials who can approve the 
drug without establishing a record for review.  In determining the 
balance, due weight should be given to all the factors, including both 
the need to protect the public health and any experimental aspects 
related to the drug use.  
3. Relevance of Enforcement Stage 
 Another factor in assessing the procedural system is whether it 
should be viewed as a two-stage process—an initial dispute resolution 
and an enforcement hearing.  The leading due process case consid-
ered by the Supreme Court involved a two-step process for calculating 
the fairness of the determination.129  The dispute resolution and en-
forcement stages in the new law warrant further examination. 
There may be questions about how the two stages interrelate.  
For example, will the dispute resolution process receive any weight at 
the enforcement hearing, or will the issues be decided de novo?  Will 
the dispute resolution be considered a final decision, and one that is 
open to immediate judicial review?130  Postponing judicial review, 
however, increases the incentive for the company to comply.  The 
company’s ability to obtain review will also be stronger if the issues 
are purely legal, or if they relate to constitutional standards.131  Will 
the hearing on the fine be solely concerned with whether a violation 
occurred, or will it consider whether a test or warning was needed?  
Will the administrative law judge’s ability to take into account “such 
other matters as justice may require” in determining the amount of 
 127 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(3) (2000). 
 128 See supra Part III.B. 
 129 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see generally Jerry L. 
Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudications in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 
(1976). 
 130 See Abbott Labs. v. Garner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–48 (1967) (discussing pre-
enforcement review); see generally Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (discussing the test for finality).   
 131 See, e.g., Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 137–38. 
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the fine encompass review of the need for the requirement?132  If 
there is further review at the enforcement stage, will this affect the 
procedures needed at the initial dispute resolution stage and the 
availability of pre-enforcement review?  The availability of a formal 
hearing can also influence the Court in finding that an administrative 
proceeding to impose money penalties satisfies other Constitutional 
requirements.133
Overall, the procedural changes relieve the agency of having to 
use formal hearings and can permit a more expeditious resolution.  
While the agency’s authority has been strengthened, in practice the 
agency and sponsor may still resolve the close issues through negotia-
tion, which should move faster now.  After all, neither the agency, the 
industry, nor the public want to see a repeat of what went wrong with 
Vioxx.  But having a fair procedure to test these issues is still impor-
tant and has now been left by Congress to the agency to determine. 
V. INCENTIVES AND DISCLOSURES TO ENCOURAGE  
BETTER INITIAL TESTING 
This Part suggests that economic incentives and better disclo-
sures may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to perform clini-
cal and comparative testing to show that a drug has a significant 
therapeutic advantage over the existing standard of care.  The limits 
of the pre-market testing for drugs make it important to consider 
ways to achieve better initial testing or post-market testing that is 
promptly completed.  There also are other benefits in having drugs 
with that kind of support.  One way to obtain such testing would be 
for Congress to require it, but that is unlikely because it would delay 
the availability of the drugs.  Another approach that has been raised 
is to provide non-patent economic incentives if the testing is done. 
A. Need for Better Testing 
Long-term clinical tests provide the best evidence about the 
safety risks of drugs for chronic use, as the history of Vioxx indicates.  
However, as the IOM pointed out, “clinical trials are designed pri-
 132 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(g)(3)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 133 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–52 (1986) 
(finding that an administrative proceeding with a formal hearing that adjudicated 
counterclaims for money reparations did not intrude into the judcial function of Ar-
ticle III courts); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 , 461(1977) (upholding administrative proceeding to impose 
fines as not being in conflict with the right to a jury trial). 
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marily with efficacy,” not safety outcomes in mind.134  If a drug spon-
sor obtains initial approval for a drug based on easy-to-prove claims 
for a chronic use like pain relief, as occurred with Vioxx, the testing 
will have less ability to surface long-term safety problems.135  Another 
benefit of better initial testing is that it would encourage companies 
to seek FDA approval for the drug’s most important use.  Also, initial 
testing will make it less likely that significant uses will be reported in-
stead in a medical journal by the sponsor, leading to off-label use 
without FDA review.136  Finally, it is desirable to have drugs provide 
significant benefits, rather than simply be a minor variation of other 
drugs.137  The FDA, however, cannot require comparative studies ab-
sent a claim by the manufacturer and cannot deny approval of a safe 
and effective drug simply because it provides a routine benefit.138
B. Incentive Proposal to Meet Testing Needs 
1. Proposal in the New England Journal of Medicine 
A proposal by Dr. Alastair Wood would use non-patent incentives 
to encourage the development of better drugs, including long-term 
post-market safety testing for drugs like Vioxx.139  The drugs would be 
approved on the same basis as they are now, but an added period of 
exclusive marketing would be available if testing was done with an 
FDA-approved design showing that the drug was safer than the stan-
dard therapy.140  If the tests were not completed on time, the ex-
tended exclusivity would be lost.  The proposal would also offer in-
centives to encourage drug sponsors to develop drugs meeting 
important medical needs such as the prevention of chronic diseases.  
For high-risk and high-need drugs, approval could be obtained based 
on surrogate indicators, but additional exclusivity would be available 
if the endpoints were converted to clinically meaningful endpoints by 
post-market testing.141
 134 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. 
 135 Psaty Testimony, supra note 12, at 18.  
 136 See supra Part II.B.6. 
 137 See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 240 (2004). 
 138 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 9, at 527. 
 139 Wood, supra note 17, at 619. 
 140 Id.  The study could show equivalence to the existing therapy but would have 
to have an adequate ability to determine comparability.  Id. at 620. 
 141 Id. at 621. 
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2. Implementation Option 
The Hatch-Waxman amendments to the food and drug laws 
provide a research incentive of three years of market exclusivity for 
post-approval clinical investigations to support any new use of a drug, 
significant or otherwise.142  These provisions might be adapted to pro-
vide incentives for better testing to demonstrate safety and a signifi-
cant comparative advantage.  The incentive would be greater if the 
drug were initially approved based on clinical trials showing that the 
drug had a therapeutically significant advantage over existing drugs.  
To encourage timely completion of studies conducted post-market, 
the maximum exclusivity would be reduced the longer it took to 
complete the study post-approval.  The scope of the exclusivity is, of 
course, important and might be eighteen months in length.  This pe-
riod is half the length of the three-year Hatch-Waxman research in-
centive for marketed drugs, but it would be stronger if tacked onto 
the end of the patent term and also barred all generic approvals.143
3. Downside 
This proposal has a significant downside, since the exclusivity 
would delay the availability of less expensive generic forms of the 
drug.  There are also risks that a new incentive will be unduly ex-
panded and have loopholes and unintended consequences.  But in 
looking at the history of Vioxx overall, a larger question is whether 
reform should only deal with improving the agency’s procedures and 
authority to require tests and improve post-market surveillance, as 
important as these goals are.  We should also consider whether it is 
possible to get drug sponsors to seek approval from the beginning or 
soon thereafter for a drug that represents an important health ad-
vance and has the best form of testing.  If this is possible, it would re-
sult in a better drug upon initial approval, as well as a better generic 
form. 
 142 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(F) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). 
 143 The exclusivity only protects the new use of the drug which allows doctors to 
prescribe the drug off-label for its original use.  The law also provides a five-year ex-
clusivity for a new chemical entity, but the incentive has “relatively limited signifi-
cance” because it runs from the date of FDA approval and is likely to expire before 
the patent.  See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA’s Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 200 (1999) (stating that exclusivity bars FDA approval for a 
five year period beginning from the date of approval of the first NDA); Bruce Kuhlik, 
The Assault on Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 98 (2004). 
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C. Disclosure of the Limits of Testing Priority Drugs and Chronic Use 
Drugs 
Disclosures may have a useful role in encouraging better testing 
if the incentive approach is not adopted.  Priority drugs are approved 
on an expedited basis because they are expected to offer a significant 
improvement over marketed therapies.144  Early approval is available 
because of the prospect of a comparative benefit over other drugs.145  
Even though the FDA cannot mandate a relative efficacy showing as a 
basis for approval, when sponsors seek a priority review because a  
drug represents a significant improvement over existing treatment, 
the labeling should reflect the extent to which a significant improve-
ment over an identified therapy has been established in FDA-
approved clinical tests.  Doing so could spur the completion of full 
tests, as well as the type of testing necessary to show whether the drug 
has a special medical benefit that justifies early approval.146  The FDA 
could also differentiate between priority drugs that represent major 
therapeutic advances147 and ordinary priority drugs that meet the pre-
sent criteria, allowing the agency to identify the drugs that will receive 
faster attention for reviews.  This distinction would be a reasonable 
basis for determining the agency’s priorities.148   
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the regulatory history of Vioxx, since it is 
likely to continue to serve as a benchmark for assessing what changes 
are necessary to make drugs safer.  One lesson from that history is the 
need for change in the formal procedures that have, until now, gov-
erned the agency’s ability to require new warnings or tests.  Though 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act already provides informal hearings 
for disputes when new risks are found for fast-track drugs, these pro-
cedures did not apply to Vioxx, a priority drug approved on an expe-
dited basis, because the sponsor did not request fast-track status.149
 144 See Kweder Finance Comm. Testimony, supra note 22, at 60; HUTT ET AL., supra 
note 10, at 708–10. 
 145 HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 691 n.4.  
 146 There can be complications in providing these disclosures, which is illustrated 
by the “special statement” the FDA allowed for Vioxx and Celebrex.  See supra Part 
II.A. 
 147 See Wood, supra note 17, at 622. 
 148 See Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk 
Signals, Preemption and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2007) (offering more discussion on disclosures of risks). 
 149 See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2000). 
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The case for a less rigorous procedure for requiring new warn-
ings is especially strong when the drugs have undergone limited test-
ing, and the risks are identified by the adverse experiences of the 
drug users or by post-market surveillance.  The initial post-market use 
of the drug has an experimental quality that needs to be taken into 
account in developing procedures.  The new law gives the agency 
specific authority to require post-approval tests and warnings and the 
authority to impose fines for violations; the agency, however, has 
been left the discretion to determine the dispute resolution proce-
dures for the new testing and warning requirements.150  In assessing 
the fairness of the scheme the agency adopts, the experimental na-
ture of the drug risks should be recognized as a major consideration 
that supports a flexible and expeditious process for requiring warn-
ings. 
Consideration should also be given to the drawbacks of the 
safety testing initially done for Vioxx.  A proposal has been made to 
provide non-patent economic incentives to encourage better long-
term comparative post-market testing for determining safety and 
benefits.151  This approach warrants Congress’s attention.  When 
drugs are approved on a priority basis, as many are, they are sup-
posed to represent a significant improvement over existing therapy.  
The agency should require disclosures when these advantages are not 
shown by adequate comparative clinical testing.152
Drug reform is an important public concern.  Drug risk cannot 
be eliminated, however, and new risks will inevitably be discovered 
after a drug is on sale.  The current legislative efforts provide the 
agency with more authority and more flexible procedures to address 
the risks discovered after the drug is on the market.  The new 
amendments ease the agency’s enforcement burdens, and the change 
signals to the public, the industry, and the agency, that Congress 
wants more forceful action when significant safety risk issues emerge, 
and that Congress will hold the agency and the industry accountable 
if that action is not taken. 
 150 See supra Part IV.A. 
 151 See Wood, supra note 17, at 623. 
 152 See supra Part V. 
